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Abstract
An important result in convex analysis is the duality between a closed convex set and
its support function. We exploit this duality to develop a novel geometric approach to
mechanism design. For a general class of social choice problems we characterize the feasi-
ble set, which is closed and convex, and its support function. We next provide a geometric
interpretation of incentive compatibility and rene the support function to include incen-
tive constraints using arguments from majorization theory. The optimal mechanism can
subsequently be derived from the support function using Hotelling's lemma.
We rst assume that values are linear in types and types are independent, private, and
one-dimensional. For this environment we provide a simple geometric proof that Bayesian
and dominant strategy implementation are equivalent by showing that the feasible sets
that remain after imposing either type of incentive constraints coincide. Furthermore,
we derive the optimal mechanism for any social choice problem and any linear objective,
including revenue and surplus maximization. As an illustration, we determine the optimal
multi-unit auction for a class of value functions that exhibit decreasing marginal valua-
tions. Other types of constraints, such as capacity constraints and budget balancedness,
can be interpreted geometrically as well, which facilitates a unied approach to a range
of social choice problems, including auctions, bargaining, and public goods provision.
We discuss how our geometric approach extends to environments with value interde-
pendencies, non-linear valuations, and correlated or multi-dimensional types. Specically,
we illustrate that with interdependent valuations the equivalence between Bayesian and
dominant strategy implementation breaks down, and our approach naturally produces the
second-best outcomes for both types of incentive constraints.
Keywords: convex sets, support functions, majorization, Hotelling's lemma, mechanism de-
sign, revenue equivalence, BIC-DIC equivalence, multi-unit auctions, bargaining, public goods
provision, capacity constraints, budget balance, interdependent values, second best eciency
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Mechanism design is the science of creating optimal social systems by maximizing a well-dened
social welfare function taking into account resource constraints and participants' incentives and
hidden information. It provides a framework to address social engineering questions like \what
auction format assigns goods most eciently or yields the highest seller revenue," \when should
a public project such as building a highway be undertaken," and \which trading rules maximize
the gains from trade?" The diculty in answering these questions stems from the fact that the
designer, or public authority, typically does not possess detailed information about the relevant
parameters, e.g. bidders' valuations for the goods for sale or voters' preferences for the public
project. A well-designed mechanism should therefore both truthfully elicit participants' private
information and implement the corresponding social optimum.
Hurwicz (1960) was among the rst to recognize the prevalence and importance of econom-
ically relevant information that is dispersed in the population.1 He introduced a formal model
of communication where agents send messages to a central planner who selects an outcome
based on a pre-specied rule. Hurwicz (1972) also introduced the key notion of incentive com-
patibility, which emphasizes the need for collecting agents' private information in a manner
that is coherent with their incentives. The study of incentive compatible mechanisms was sig-
nicantly simplied through the observation of the revelation principle by Gibbard (1973) and
subsequent extensions to incomplete information environments by Dasgupta, Hammond, and
Maskin (1979) and Myerson (1979). This principle implies that general mechanisms or insti-
tutions can be analyzed through equivalent direct revelation mechanisms, where participants'
only form of communication or action is the revelation of their private information.
Notwithstanding this simplication, the constraints imposed by incentive compatibility are
generally treated separately from other more basic constraints, such as resource constraints.
As a result, mechanism design theory appears to have developed quite dierently from classical
approaches to consumer and producer choice theory despite some obvious parallels. For exam-
ple, in producer choice theory, the rm also maximizes a well-dened objective, its prot, over
a feasible production set that reects its resource constraints. A well-known result is that a
rm's optimal production plan follows by evaluating the gradient of the prot function at out-
put and factor prices { Hotelling's lemma. One contribution of this paper is to draw a parallel
between classical choice theory and mechanism design by showing how the revenue-maximizing
or surplus-maximizing mechanism can be derived using standard micro-economics tools.
1Early contributors include Hayek (1945) who contemplated the feasibility of a centralized socialist economy.
1Our approach is geometric in nature and utilizes convexity of the set of feasible, incentive
compatible outcomes. In particular, starting from the basic feasible set that is the product of
probability simplices, we determine the set that remains after imposing incentive constraints.
We do so by providing a geometric interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints,
which puts them on an equal footing with the basic resource constraints. Exploiting convexity
of the resulting set, we subsequently derive the optimal mechanism using Hotelling's lemma.
The challenge lies in keeping track of the (high-dimensional) set that remains after feasi-
bility and incentive compatibility constraints are imposed. To this end we employ techniques
from convex analysis, a subeld of mathematics that studies properties of convex sets and
functions. A key result in convex analysis is the duality between a closed convex set and its
support function, which is convex and homogeneous of degree one (e.g. a rm's prot function).
Conversely, any convex function that is homogeneous of degree one denes a convex set. We
exploit this duality to derive the support function of the basic feasible set for a general class
of social choice problems. Furthermore, support functions possess convenient algebraic prop-
erties that facilitate the description of the union, sum, and intersection of convex sets. These
algebraic properties allow us to rene the support function to include incentive constraints.
Using arguments from majorization theory, we show that this approach naturally generates the
\ironing" procedure rst described by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Myerson (1981).
A major question in mechanism design is whether dominant strategy incentive compatibility
is more stringent than Bayesian incentive compatibility. For example, does requiring dominant
strategy incentive compatibility limit a seller's revenue or overall welfare? A recent contribu-
tion by Manelli and Vincent (2010) shows this is not true for the special case of single-unit,
private-value auctions: Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and dominant strategy incen-
tive compatibility (DIC) are equivalent in this setting. Goeree and Kushnir (2011) extend this
BIC-DIC equivalence result to a broad class of social choice problems by generalizing a theorem
due to Gutmann et al. (1991), which was introduced to the economics literature by Gershkov,
Moldovanu, and Shi (2011).
In this paper we take a new perspective on the issue, one that ts with our geometric
approach. What matters to agents at the time they make their decisions is how BIC and DIC
constraints compare at the interim stage, i.e. when agents know only their own types and the
distributions of others' types. We rst show that each ex post DIC constraint can be represented
by a vector in some high-dimensional space and then study how this vector transforms under
the linear transformation (of taking expectations over others' types) that represents going from
the ex post to the interim stage. We demonstrate that, at the interim stage, the projected DIC
2constraints coincide with the BIC constraints. We make these arguments precise by proving
that the support functions for both types of incentive constraints are identical.
Importantly, support functions provide a useful tool when maximizing some linear social
objective over the set of feasible, incentive compatible outcomes. Both revenue maximization
and surplus maximization t the linear framework and, as a result, the revenue-maximizing
and surplus-maximizing mechanisms follow from the support function by applying Hotelling's
lemma. More generally, we determine the optimal mechanism for any social choice problem
and any linear objective and show that the resulting mechanism is dominant strategy incentive
compatible and ex post individually rational. We illustrate the power of our approach by
deriving the optimal multi-unit auction for a class of value functions that exhibit decreasing
marginal valuations, a result that is new to the auction literature.
The geometric interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints extends to other
types of constraints, which allows us to revisit and unify a number of important applications
of mechanism design. For instance, in auctions with many items for sale, bidders typically face
some budget or capacity constraints. We show that such constraints can easily be incorporated
into the support function from which the second-best mechanism follows using Hotelling's
lemma. Moreover, we demonstrate that budget balancedness, which is a natural requirement
in bargaining and public goods provision, can be dealt with in a similar manner.
Finally, we show that our methods apply beyond the main model of the paper, which assumes
that values are linear in types and that types are independent, private, and one-dimensional. For
example, we illustrate that with interdependent values the equivalence between Bayesian and
dominant strategy incentive compatibility no longer holds. Nevertheless, our support function
approach naturally extends to this setting and produces the second-best mechanisms for both
types of incentive constraints.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic duality result from
convex analysis and list several other useful facts.2 Section 3 rst describes the support func-
tions for the ex post and interim feasible sets and then incorporates incentive constraints. We
prove BIC-DIC equivalence and revenue equivalence and derive the optimal dominant strategy
mechanism for a broad class of social choice problems. In section 4 we apply our geometric pro-
cedure to other types of constraints, which naturally occur in multi-unit auctions, bargaining,
and public goods provision. Section 5 discusses extensions that allow for value interdependen-
cies, non-linear valuations, and correlated or multi-dimensional types. Section 6 concludes and
the Appendix contains the proofs.
2Proofs of these facts can be found in Convex Analysis by Rockafellar (1997).
32. Preliminaries from Convex Analysis
An important concept in convex analysis is the duality between a closed convex set C  IR
n
and its support function SC : IR
n ! IR, which is dened as
S
C(w) = supfv  wjv 2 Cg
with v  w =
Pn
i=1 viwi the usual inner product. The support function is homogeneous of
degree 1, i.e. SC(w) = SC(w) for any   0, and convex, i.e. SC(w1 + (1   )w2) 
SC(w1) + (1   )SC(w2) for any  2 [0;1]. Conversely, any lower semi-continuous function
dened over IR
n that is convex and homogeneous of degree 1 is the support function of a closed




n jv  w  S
C(w) 8w 2 IR
n	
To illustrate, consider the two-dimensional simplex C = f(v1;v2)jv1  0;v2  0;v1 + v2  1g
shown in the left panel of Figure 1. In this panel, the blue arrows represent arbitrary vectors
w 2 IR
2 and the label next to the arrow shows the outcome of the maximization problem
supfv  wjv 2 Cg. It is readily veried that the support function for the two-dimensional
simplex can be summarized as
S
C(w) = max(0;w1;w2)
In turn, the two-dimensional simplex can be recovered from the support function by considering,
for each w 2 IR
2, the inequality
v  w  S
C(w)
This inequality denes a half space of possible v 2 IR
2 for each w 2 IR
2. In the right panel of
Figure 1 these half spaces are bounded by the green lines and their intersection reproduces the
two-dimensional simplex. It is straightforward to generalize the example to n dimensions.
Fact 1. For the n-dimensional simplex





















Figure 1. Illustration of duality. The left panel shows how the support function SC(w1;w2) follows
by maximizing v  w over the simplex C = f(v1;v2)jv1  0;v2  0;v1 + v2  1g. The right panel
shows how the simplex can be recovered from the inequalities v  w  SC(w1;w2) for all w 2 IR2,
where the support function is given by SC(w1;w2) = max(0;w1;w2).
The support functions for the convex sets C1 and C2 can be used to construct the support
function for associated sets. Two relevant cases are the sum
C1 + C2 = fv1 + v2 jv1 2 C1; v2 2 C2g
and the intersection C1 \ C2, both of which are convex. An example of the sum is shown in
the left panel of Figure 2, where C1 and C2 are one-dimensional simplices embedded in IR
2
(indicated by the thick lines on the axes) and their sum is the unit square. The example in the
right panel shows the intersection of the two-dimensional simplex C1 = fv 2 IR
2
+jv1 + v2  1g
with the half space C2 = fv 2 IR
2 jv2  v1g.









C2(w2)jw1 + w2 = wg
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the support function of the sum of two one-dimensional
simplices. Recall from Fact 1 that SC1(w) = max(0;w1) and SC2(w) = max(0;w2). It is readily





















Figure 2. The left panel shows the support function for the sum of two one-dimensional simplices.
The right panel shows the support function for the intersection of the two-dimensional simplex and
the half-space above the 45 degree line.
max(0;w1) + max(0;w2), as indicated by the labels next to the arrows in the left panel of
Figure 2.
To compute the support function for the intersection in the right panel, we rst need to
determine the support function for the unbounded half space C2. Dene  = ( 1;1) so that






1 if w 6=  
0 if w =  




max(0;w1   ;w2 + )
The inmum is attained when  = max(0; 1




max(0;w1;w2) if w1  w2
max(0; 1
2(w1 + w2)) if w1  w2
as shown by the labels next to the arrows in the right panel of Figure 2.
In the applications below, we will frequently need the support function for a closed convex set
on which multiple constraints mv  Km for m = 1;:::;M are imposed. The support function
can be derived by repeatedly applying Fact 2, and we list the result here for convenience.
6Fact 3. The support function of a closed convex set C intersected with the half spaces mv 











We next determine how the support function transforms under a linear mapping A : IR
n ! IR
m.
For any v 2 IR
n and w 2 IR
m we have Av  w = v  ATw where AT denotes the transpose of
A, i.e. (AT)ij = Aji. This well-known property of the inner product can be used to derive the
support function of the convex set AC obtained by applying the linear transformation A to
elements of the convex set C.
Fact 4. Let A : IR
n ! IR






for any w 2 IR
m.





is applied to the two-dimensional simplex shown in the left panel of Figure 1. The gray shaded
area depicts the resulting convex set and the associated support function is given by SAC(w) =
max(0;w1;w1 + w2) as indicated by the labels next to the arrows.
An alternative way to represent a convex set is in terms of its extreme points or \vertices."
In the right panel of Figure 3 these vertices are indicated by the red dots. It is well known that
a bounded closed convex set is simply the convex hull of its vertices, which can be obtained by
computing the gradient of the support function at points where it is dierentiable. To illustrate,
consider the support function of the two-dimensional simplex SC(w) = max(0;w1;w2), which
is dierentiable when (i) max(w1;w2) < 0, (ii) max(0;w1) < w2, and (iii) max(0;w2) < w1.
The corresponding gradients yield the three vertices shown in the right panel of Figure 3, i.e.
V1 = (0;0), V2 = (0;1), and V3 = (1;0) respectively.
What about the edges or \faces" of the two-dimensional simplex, which are labeled F1, F2,
















Figure 3. The left panel illustrates the support function for a transformed two-dimensional simplex.
In the right panel the two-dimensional simplex is seen as the convex hull of its vertices, Vi, which can
be calculated by taking the gradient of the support function at points of dierentiability. Similarly,
the edges or faces, Fi, of the two-dimensional simplex correspond to the subgradient of the support
function at points of non-dierentiability.
the support function in which case the gradient should be replaced by the subgradient. Recall
that a vector g 2 IR




C(w) + g  (z   w)
for all z 2 IR
n. Consider, for example, the support function SC(w) = max(0;w1;w2) of the
two-dimensional simplex and the following points of non-dierentiability, w1 = 0 and w2 < 0.
For any such w the subgradient is any vector g = (g1;0) with 0  g1  1.3 The set of
all subgradients at w is called the subdierential of the support function at w. To keep the
notation simple we will also denote the subdierential by rSC(w). For w = (0;w2) with
w2 < 0, the subdierential consists of the face F1 that connects V1 and V3 in the right panel
of Figure 3. The other faces can be recovered similarly by considering other points of non-
dierentiability, i.e. F2 follows from w = (w1;0) with w1 < 0 and F3 follows from w = (w;w)
with w > 0.
To summarize, any point on the boundary of the convex set C can be written as rSC(w)
for some w 2 IR
n. This allows for the following characterization of the maximization of a linear
function over the convex set C.
3Let g = (g1;g2). For z1 < 0 and z2 = w2 < 0 the subgradient inequality yields g1  0 and for z1 > 0 and
z2 = w2 it yields g1  1. Likewise, for z1 = 0 and z2 = 0 the subgradient inequality yields g2  0 and for z1 = 0
and z2 < w2 it yields g2  0.
8Fact 5. Consider some closed convex set C in IR
n and some vector ! 2 IR
n. Then
supfv  ! jv 2 Cg = S
C(!)
argsupfv  ! jv 2 Cg = rS
C(!)
The second part of Fact 5 is a generalization of the envelope theorem, or Hotelling's lemma, that
allows for points of non-dierentiability. This form of Hotelling's lemma will play an important
role in the applications below, where it is used to derive the optimal allocation rule directly
from the support function.
We end this section with a result from majorization theory. Let p1;:::;pn denote arbitrary
non-negative numbers and consider two sequences  and & with elements i;&i for i = 1;:::;n.













The following result, due to Fuchs (1947), can be found in Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2011).








for any continuous convex function g : IR ! IR.
Consider any sequence , not necessarily non-decreasing, and let + denote the non-decreasing
sequence such that (i)  p + and (ii) any other non-decreasing sequence & that satises
 p & is p-majorized by +.4 The second property motivates calling + the largest non-
decreasing sequence that satises  p +. Its usefulness stems from the following fact.






4See Bapat (1991) for arguments that ensure existence of such a sequence.
9Figure 4. Illustration of majorization. The three sequences in the leftmost panel are 1 = (1;2;6)
(solid blue circles), 2 = (2;6;1) (red squares), and 3 = (6;1;2) (open green circles). The rightmost
panel shows the corresponding + sequences: +
1 = (1;2;6), +
2 = (2; 7
2; 7
2), and +
3 = (3;3;3). The
two middle panels (with rescaled y-axis) show the cumulative sequences for  (middle-left) and +
(middle-right). The cumulative of + is the largest convex function below the cumulative of .
Figure 4 illustrates the construction when n = 3 and pi = 1 for i = 1;:::;n. The leftmost
panel shows the sequences 1 = (1;2;6), 2 = (2;6;1), and 3 = (6;1;2). The rightmost
panel shows the corresponding 
+
1 = (1;2;6), 
+




3 = (3;3;3). Note that
 = + if and only if  is non-decreasing. The middle panels show the cumulative sequences
for  (left) and + (right) and demonstrates that the cumulative of + is the largest convex
function that is below the cumulative of . Our discrete majorization procedure thus parallels
Myerson's (1981) \ironing" technique for continuous type spaces. Lemma 1 will be important
when minimizing the support function with respect to the constraint parameters as in Fact 3.
3. Social Choice Implementation
We consider an environment with a nite set I = f1;2;:::;Ig of agents and a nite set
K = f1;2;:::;Kg of social alternatives. When alternative k is selected, agent i's value is
ak
ixi where ak
i is some non-negative constant and agent i's type, xi, is distributed according
to probability distribution fi(xi) with discrete support Xi = fx1
i;:::;x
Ni







i for j = 2;:::;Ni. This formulation is rich enough to include many
important applications, e.g. single or multi-unit auctions, public goods provision, bargaining,
etc. For example, single-unit auctions are captured by setting ak
i = k
i for i = 1;:::;I and
k = 1;:::;I + 1, where alternative i = 1;:::;I corresponds to the case where bidder i wins
the object and alternative I + 1 corresponds to the case where the seller keeps the object. As
another example, public goods provision can be summarized by two alternatives, i.e. k = 1
when the public good is implemented and k = 2 when it is not, and ak
i = k
1 for i = 1;:::;I.
10We denote the prole of all agents' types by x = (x1;:::;xI) 2 X =
Q
i2I Xi. Without
loss of generality we restrict attention to direct mechanisms characterized by K + I functions,
fqk(x)gk2K and fti(x)gi2I, where ti(x) 2 IR is agent i's payment and qk(x) is the probability
that alternative k is implemented. We dene vi(x) =
P
k2K ak
iqk(x) so that agent i's utility
from truthful reporting, assuming others report truthfully as well, is ui(x) = xivi(x)   ti(x).
3.1. Feasibility
The probabilities with which the alternatives occur satisfy the usual feasibility conditions
qk(x)  0 for k 2 K, x 2 X and
P
k2K qk(x)  1 for all x 2 X. In other words, the fea-
sible qk(x) dene a k-dimensional simplex for each type prole. We can invoke Fact 2 and
simply write the support function S : IR
KjXj ! IR as a sum, over all type proles, of support





















k(x) 8i 2 I; x 2 X
	
which is a convex, closed, and bounded set. Its support function S : IR
IjXj ! IR follows by
























k(x)) 8i 2 I; xi 2 Xi
	
Throughout we distinguish interim variables using capital letters, e.g. the interim expected
values are denoted Vi(xi) for i 2 I, xi 2 Xi. Since Vi(xi) = Ex i(vi(x)), going from the ex post
to the interim stage entails taking a sum over others' types, x i, weighted with the product
probability
Q
j6=i fj(xj). This is a linear transformation so once more we can invoke Fact 4.
11To arrive at expressions that are symmetric in the probabilities we multiply the weight Wi(xi)
associated with Vi(xi) by fi(xi) so that all terms are weighted with f(x) =
Q
i fi(xi). In other
words, when we dene the interim support function Sinterim : IR
P
i jXij ! IR as
Sinterim(W) = supfV  WjV 2 VPSg
the inner product on the right side is probability weighted, i.e.




















The intuition for the support-function inequalities V  W  Sinterim(W), is as follows. For
given weights, W, the expected value implied by the interim values V is equal to VW, which
can be no higher than the maximum possible expected value Sinterim(W) at these weights.
3.2. Incentive Compatibility
A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) if truthful reporting is a dominant
strategy equilibrium. Necessary and sucient conditions for a mechanism (q;t) to be DIC is
that vi(xi;x i) is non-decreasing in xi for all i 2 I, x 2 X, and that the payments satisfy5
(vi(x
n






i ;x i)   ti(x
n 1
i ;x i)  (vi(x
n






for n = 2;:::;Ni. Moreover, ex post individual rationality (EXIR) requires that ui(x)  0 for
x 2 X, i 2 I, which is most binding for the lowest-type agent and determines the following range
of payments for this agent: 0  ti(x1
i;x i)  vi(x1
i;x i)x1
i. Note that the ex post individual
rationality condition can be included as one of the incentive compatibility constraints in (4),
namely for n = 1, if we set x0
i = 0 and vi(x0
i;x i) = ti(x0
i;x i) = 0.
5Notice that we consider only \adjacent" incentive constraints, which are necessary and sucient when a
bidder's value is linear in her private, one-dimensional type (see, e.g., Goeree and Kushnir, 2011).
12Similarly, a mechanism (q;t) is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if truthful reporting is
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. BIC holds if and only if Vi(xi) is non-decreasing in xi for all i 2 I,
xi 2 Xi, and the payments satisfy
(Vi(x
n






i )   Ti(x
n 1
i )  (Vi(x
n





for n = 2;:::;Ni. Furthermore, interim individual rationality (INIR) requires that Ui(xi)  0
for all xi 2 Xi, i 2 I, which holds if 0  Ti(x1
i)  Vi(x1
i)x1
i. Also this individual rationality




We postpone solving for the payments that satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions to
Section 3.2.2. First, we demonstrate that the set of feasible interim expected values that are
dominant strategy implementable coincide with those that are Bayesian implementable. In
other words, from an interim perspective, dominant strategy incentive compatibility is no more
stringent than Bayesian incentive compatibility.
To glean some intuition for this result, we start with a simple example. Consider the case of
two agents and two equally likely types x < x. For each of the four type proles, (x;x), (x;x),
(x;x), and (x;x), the feasible set is a two-dimensional simplex, as shown in the left panel of
Figure 1. The vps, i.e. the ex post feasible set, is thus the product of four two-dimensional
simplices and an element v(x) 2 vps is an eight-dimensional vector
v(x) = (v1(x;x);v1(x;x);v1(x;x);v1(x;x);v2(x;x);v2(x;x);v2(x;x);v2(x;x))
The dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraints that vi(xi;x i) be non-decreasing in





The VPS, i.e. the set of interim expected values, is a four-dimensional set consisting of vectors
V = (V1(x);V1(x);V2(x);V2(x))







1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0




to elements v(x) of the vps. The Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints that Vi(xi) be
non-decreasing in xi for all i 2 I, can be written as Bm  V  0 for m = 1;2 where
B1 = ( 1;1;0;0)
B2 = (0;0; 1;1)
Note that the constraint generated by B1 is the same as that generated by P1 or P2.
Similarly, B2 generates the same constraint as P3 or P4. In other words, the DIC constraints,
, are mapped exactly onto the BIC constraints, B. At the interim stage, requiring dominant
strategy incentive compatibility is the same as requiring Bayesian incentive compatibility.
To make this intuition more precise we use the support function to keep track of the set of
feasible, incentive compatible outcomes. Generalizing the above example, a geometric charac-








 v  0
for j = 2;:::;Ni, x i 2
Q
j 6=i Xj, i 2 I, where each e(x) is a unit vector in IR
IjXj. Likewise,
















 V  0
for j = 2;:::;Ni, i 2 I, where each E(xi) is a unit vector in IR
P
i jXij. The inverse probabilities
appear because the inner product used at the interim stage is probability weighted.
To compare BIC and DIC constraints from an agent's viewpoint we determine the interim


















i ;x i) = 0 and i(x0
i) = i(x
Ni
i ) = 0.
14Proposition 2. The support function for the set of feasible interim expected values that satisfy











































The minimization problem that denes the DIC support function involves more parameters
and, hence, could result in a lower support function (reecting a smaller set). This is not the
case, however, if an agent's ex post DIC constraints for dierent proles of others' types are
all mapped to the same BIC constraint when we take an interim viewpoint, as in the example
above. In terms of the minimization problems in Proposition 2 this would imply that the
optimal parameters satisfy i(xi;x i) = i(xi) for all x i.
Consider again the above example with two agents and two equally-likely types and suppose
we set ak
i = k
i and impose symmetry so that we can drop agent-specic subscripts. The two







max(0;W   ) +
1
2











max(0;W   ) +
1
2




The solution to the latter problem is readily calculated as  = max(0; 1
2(W W)). Furthermore,
if we set  =  in the DIC minimization problem then the solution for  is . Conversely, if
we set  =  then the solution for  is . In other words, (;) = (;) generates a local
minimum, and by convexity of the support function, it is the global solution. For this example,
the resulting BIC and DIC support functions are thus the same.
6Without loss of generality we can scale the  and  parameters by 1
2.
15We next establish this equivalence more generally and determine the support function that
results from minimizing over the  (or ) parameters. Dene the shifted weights
f Wi(xi) = Wi(xi)  
i(xi)
fi(xi)





























i.e. Wi fi f Wi. Let W
+
i denote the largest non-decreasing sequence that satises Wi fi W
+
i
for i 2 I, and let W+ denote their concatenation (cf. Lemma 1).
Proposition 3 (BIC{DIC Equivalence). The support function for the set of feasible interim







for any W 2 IR
P
i jXij where Sinterim is given by equation (3) in Proposition 1.
We next construct equivalent payments for the BIC and DIC mechanisms so that they deliver
the same interim expected utilities to all agents. Importantly, we show that common objectives
such as revenue or surplus maximization can be interpreted as optimizing a linear function
over the set of feasible, incentive compatible outcomes. This allows us to derive the optimal
mechanism by applying Hotelling's lemma to the support function in Proposition 3.
3.2.2. Payments and Revenues
The incentive constraints in (4) and (5) bound the dierence in payments in terms of the
dierence in values times a number that lies between x
n 1
i and xn















where 0  n






i )   i(x0
i)  0 for k = 1;:::;Ni with equality for k = Ni.
16Lemma 2. In any dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational mech-
anism the payments are given by
ti(x
n























for n = 1;:::;Ni and i 2 I. Likewise, in any Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individ-
ually rational mechanism the payments are given by
Ti(x
n























for n = 1;:::;Ni and i 2 I. The lowest and highest BIC and DIC payments follow by setting
n
i = 0 and n
i = 1 respectively.
The BIC-DIC equivalence result of Proposition 3 implies that for any increasing Vi(xi) one can
construct vi(xi;x i) such that Ex i(vi(xi;x i)) = Vi(xi). The interim expected values of the
DIC payments are therefore equal to the BIC payments, i.e. Ex i(ti(xi;x i)) = Ti(xi). An
important consequence is that the BIC and DIC mechanism yield the same expected utilities
for all agents, i.e. they are equivalent (see also Goeree and Kushnir, 2011). In particular, the
expected revenue from any BIC mechanism can be obtained from an equivalent DIC mechanism.






i) and the marginal revenues
MRi(x
n























i . Let MR() denote the vector with elements
MRi(xn
i ), where we make explicit the dependence on the n
i parameters. Any vector  with
elements between 0 and 1 ensures incentive compatibility. Of special interest are the lowest
and highest marginal revenues MR = MR(0) and MR = MR(1).
Lemma 3. The expected revenue, R, and the expected social surplus, S, can be written as
R = V  MR()
S = V  x
where V  W =
P
i Exi(Vi(xi)Wi(xi)) for any W 2 IR
P
i jXij.
17An important corollary to this lemma is a revenue equivalence result for general social choice
environments. For mechanisms that employ the same allocation rule and, hence, result in the
same interim values, V, the revenue is completely determined by the  constants.8
Corollary 1 (Revenue Equivalence). Any interim individually rational, incentive com-
patible mechanism that results in interim expected values V yields an expected revenue in the
range
V  MR  R  V  MR
Another consequence of Lemma 3 is that the revenue and surplus maximizing mechanisms
can be obtained by applying Hotelling's lemma to the support function in Proposition 3. The
next proposition establishes this more generally, i.e. for arbitrary social choice problems and
arbitrary linear objectives. For notational simplicity we set  = 1, corresponding to the highest
incentive compatible payments.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Mechanism). For any social choice problem and for any linear





1=jMj if k 2 M
0 otherwise
(8)





























In particular, the highest possible revenue, Sinterim(MR
+
), follows by choosing ! = MR and
the highest possible surplus, Sinterim(x), follows by choosing ! = x.




is non-decreasing in agent i's type, xi, for any prole of others' types. Ex post individual
rationality follows since ti(x) 
P
k ak
ixiqk(x) = xivi(x) so ui(x) = xivi(x)   ti(x)  0.
To illustrate, consider a multi-unit auction with I  1 ex ante symmetric bidders and K
perfectly divisible units. Bidders' types are distributed according to a common probability
8Note that with discrete types there is a larger range of possible revenues than with continuous types. In
the continuous case, the expected revenue is pinned down by V and the payments of the lowest types { stated
dierently, given V, the only degrees of freedom are 0  1
i  1 for i 2 I. In the discrete case, the degrees of
freedom are 0  n
i  1 for n = 1;:::;Ni, i 2 I.
18distribution f() with support X = fx1;:::;xNg for some N  1. Suppose bidders have
diminishing marginal valuations, i.e. they value winning q units at v(q) where v() is some
concave function. While the diminishing marginal value assumption is natural for many multi-
unit auctions, e.g. treasury auctions, it has proven intractable to derive closed-form solutions
for this case (see Ausubel and Cramton, 1998). In contrast, the next proposition establishes
the dominant strategy auction when bidders' value functions obey a power law.
Proposition 5. When v(qi) = q
1 
i for i = 1;:::;I, with 0 <  < 1, the ex post support
function is

























In both cases, the ex post payment rule is given by












In the limit when  tends to one, the ecient allocation rule assigns units proportionally
to bidders' types while the optimal allocation rule assigns units proportionally to bidders'
marginal revenues. For intermediate values, 0 <  < 1, the ecient and optimal allocation
rules resemble \Tullock-type" success functions. Finally, Myerson's (1981) familiar result for
the optimal auction is obtained in the limit when  tends to zero, which corresponds to the
linear valuation case v(q) = q. Now the ecient allocation rule is to assign all units to the
highest-type bidder while the revenue-maximizing allocation rule assigns all units to the bidder
with the highest positive marginal revenue (and assigns no units if all marginal revenues are
negative).
9Where we interpret 0=0 as 0.
194. Incorporating Other Types of Constraints
In this section we demonstrate how our geometric approach facilitates the inclusion of other
types of ex ante or ex post constraints, such as budget balancedness in bargaining and pub-
lic goods provision. First, we consider multi-unit auctions where the bidders have capacity
constraints, i.e. their demand is \at" up to a certain number of units.
4.1. Capacity Constraints in Multi-Unit Auctions
There are K  1 perfectly divisible units for sale and I  1 bidders with linear valuations. In
the absence of any capacity constraints the ex post support function is given by






Now suppose that bidder i has capacity Ki < K. This implies the following constraint on the
ex post allocation rule: qi(x)  Ki, or, equivalently, qei  Ki, where ei is the i-th unit vector
in IR













For r = 1;:::;I, let wi(r)(x) denote the weight with rank r for each x. The capacity of the
bidder with rank 1 is less than K, i.e. Ki(1) < K, so raising i(1)(x) from 0 lowers the objective.
Suppose we raise i(1)(x) to wi(1)(x) wi(2)(x) then, as long as Ki(1) +Ki(2) < K, subsequently
raising both i(1)(x) and i(2)(x) at the same speed lowers the objective, etc. Let 1  r  I
denote the largest rank such that
( Pr
r =1 Ki(r)  K
wi(r)  0













where wi(r+1) = 0 if r = I. The revenue-maximizing allocation rule follows from Hotelling's
lemma, i.e. from rSconstrained(MR
+
).
20Proposition 6. The revenue-maximizing mechanism assigns to the bidders with the highest
positive marginal revenues their capacities until the total quantity K is exhausted or all bidders
with positive marginal revenues have been served.
This result was previously derived by Maskin and Riley (1989) for the case where each bidder
has a capacity of 1 (see also Ausubel and Cramton, 1998).
4.2. Public Goods Provision with Ex Post Budget Balancedness
Consider I  1 agents whose valuations for a public good are high, x, with probability p and
low, x, with probability 1   p. There are only K = 2 alternatives, i.e. either the public good
is produced or not. Let q(x) denote the probability that the public good is produced when the
realized type prole is x. If the marginal cost of producing the public good production is C,




for each x 2 X, and the public good is produced if and only if this condition is met. In the





We focus on symmetric mechanisms and denote by q(m), m = 0;:::;I, the probability that
the public good is produced when m agents are of high type and I  m agents are of low type.
Similarly, t(x;m) and t(x;m) are the payments of a low-type agent and a high-type agent in
this event. The individual rationality and ex post incentive compatibility constraints imply the
following upper bound on the agents' payments:
t(x;m) = q(m)x
t(x;m) = (q(m)   q(m   1))x + q(m   1)x
For convenience, let us parameterize the cost of the public good as C = x + (I   )x where
 2 f0;:::;Ig. The ex post budget balance constraint becomes m  q  0 for m = 0;:::;I,
where
m = (0;:::;0;m(x   x)
| {z }
m 1











0;wm + (x   x)(m(m   )   m+1(m + 1)

(10)
with I+1 = 0. For m <  the coecients multiplying m are non-positive so the inmum is
achieved for m = 1. Hence, for these proles the public good is not provided. For m  , the
m can be solved recursively by pushing the second argument of the max function to 0, except
for the nal term of the sum (i.e. when m = I).
























if m  
0 otherwise







Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) consider the limit when the number of people grows large,
I ! 1, and the per-capita cost of producing the public good is constant. This implies that
 is proportional to I and also diverges, so the probability that the public good is produced
tends to 0. This is true even when the per-capita cost is low, say 9
10x+ 1
10x, and the probability
of a high type is high, say p = 9
10, so that the per-capita value of the public good, 1
10x + 9
10x,
far exceeds its cost. In other words, the public good is not produced even when it is common
knowledge that it would be ecient to do so.
In contrast, Hellwig (2003) assumes that the total cost of producing the public good is
constant, which means that  will tend to 0 as the number of people diverges. Now the
probability of ecient public goods provision goes to 1 for all p > 0.
224.3. Bargaining with Ex Ante Budget Balancedness
Following Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) we consider a simple bargaining setting with a sin-
gle seller and a single buyer. Seller and buyer values are discrete, i.e. xb;xs 2 X = fx1;:::;xNg
for N  1, with probability distributions fb(x) and fs(x) that are not necessarily the same. Let
q(xb;xs) denote the probability of trade given prole x = (xb;xs), then the value gain to the
buyer is her type times q(xb;xs) and the gain to the seller is her type times  q(xb;xs). The ex





The interim expected probability of trade from the buyer's point of view is given by Qb(xb) =
Exs(q(xb;xs)) and from the seller's point of view it is Qs(xs) = Exb(q(xb;xs)). The implied





We consider ex ante budget balance, which can be stated as Q  MR  0 where Q =















for j = 1;:::;N with x0 = 0 and xN+1 = xN. Using Fact 3, the interim support function that





max(0;Wb(xb)   Ws(xs) + (MRb(xb)   MRs(xs)))

When the constrained support function is evaluated at Wb(xb) = xb and Ws(xs) = xs, the
argument of the max function is positive if and only if MR
b(xb) > MR
s(xs) where we dened























The surplus-maximizing allocation rule can be read o from the gradient rSconstrained.
















In particular, in the second-best outcome, neither "no trade" ( = 1) nor "fully ecient trade"
( = 0) occur.
5. Extensions
When we relax one of the assumptions of the main model, i.e. that values are linear in types
and types are private, independent, and one-dimensional, the equivalence between Bayesian and
dominant strategy implementation breaks down. Importantly, however, this does not mean that
our geometric approach cannot be applied. Let vk
i (x) denote agent i's value when alternative






I ), i.e. agent i's type is
Ti dimensional. Let Xi =
QTi
j=1 Xij where each Xij = fx1
ij;:::;x
Nij
ij g and let X =
Q
i Xi. We
allow for correlation in types and denote the joint probability distribution by f(x).
Note that this setup relaxes all assumptions of the main model: the values vk
i can be non-
linear functions of the types, the values are not private since they depend on others' types,
and types are correlated and multi-dimensional. While the setup is much more general, the
derivation of the ex post and interim support functions parallels that of Proposition 1.
Proposition 9. The support function Sex post : IR












and the support function Sinterim : IR
P












These support functions determine the set of feasible values without any incentive constraints
imposed. For the general model, determining the consequences of Bayesian or dominant strategy
24incentive compatibility is complicated and requires more than comparing adjacent types only.
We leave a complete analysis to future research but illustrate how our methodology applies to
the case of linear value interdependencies for which adjacent comparisons are sucient.
5.1. Interdependent Values
Consider a single-unit auction with two bidders and two equally likely and independent types,
x = 1 and x = 10. Bidders' values depend on both their types in a simple linear way
vi(xi;xj) = xi + xj
for i 6= j = 1;2. A continuous-type version of this example was rst studied by Maskin (1992),
who showed that when  > 1 the rst-best ecient outcome is not Bayesian implementable
(and, hence, not dominant strategy implementable). Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2011)
show that, with two bidders, the second-best outcome can be implemented via an English
auction, although its equilibrium is not in dominant strategies. In other words, when  > 1,
the second-best outcome is Bayesian but not dominant strategy implementable and BIC-DIC
equivalence fails.
We show these results are neatly explained by comparing the sets of feasible outcomes that
satisfy Bayesian and dominant strategy incentive compatible respectively. Since the bidders are
ex ante symmetric, the allocation rule has no player specic subscript and can be represented
by a four-dimensional vector
q(x) = (q(x;x);q(x;x);q(x;x);q(x;x))
The dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraints can be written as m  q  0 for
m = 1;2 where
1 = ( 1;1;0;0)
2 = (0;0; 1;1)
The VPS, i.e. the set of interim expected values, consists of two-dimensional vectors
V = (V (x);V (x))





1 +  0 1 + 10 0
0 10 +  0 10 + 10

25to the ex post allocation probabilities q(x). The Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint is
most easily expressed in terms of the ex post allocation probabilities, i.e. B  q  0 where
B = ( 1;1; 1;1)
Note that for  > 0 it is no longer the case that P1 and P2 are proportional to PB. This
is the simple reason that BIC-DIC equivalence fails.
To make this precise we next compare the support functions for the feasible interim expected
values that satisfy Bayesian and dominant strategy incentive compatibility respectively. Using







max(0;(1 + )W   ) +
1
2












max(0;(1 + )W   ) +
1
2




max(0;(10 + 10)W + )
For  = 0 the support functions reduce to those in Section 3 and BIC-DIC equivalence holds.
However, for  > 0 the DIC and BIC minimization problems will in general yield dierent
values for , , and , resulting in dierent sets.10
Figure 5 shows the sets of interim feasible values that result when  = 0 (left panel),  = 1
2
(middle panel), and  = 2 (right panel). In each of the panels, the light area corresponds
to the set of feasible outcomes without any incentive constraints imposed, the medium dark
area to the Bayesian implementable outcomes, and the dark area to the dominant strategy
implementable outcomes. When  = 0 the latter two sets coincide as shown by the left panel,
but BIC-DIC equivalence generally fails when  > 0 as shown by the middle and right panels.
The easiest way to describe the dierent sets is by their vertices,11 which correspond to
certain specic allocation rules. For instance, the set of feasible outcomes that are dominant
10For (1+10)W  (10+)W the solutions are  =  =  = 0, while for (1+10)W  (10+)W possible
solutions are  = 1
2((1 + 10)W   (10 + )W),  = (1 + )W, and  = 9W + min((1 + )W; (10 + )W).
11The vertices follow from the gradient of the support function at points of dierentiability. Using the solutions











2 + 5;5 + 1







Figure 5. Illustration of BIC-DIC equivalence and its failure. Shown are the feasible outcomes
with no incentive constraints imposed (light), Bayesian implementable outcomes (medium dark), and
dominant strategy implementable outcomes (dark) for  = 0 (left panel),  = 1
2 (middle panel), and
 = 2 (right panel). The largest blue dot indicates the rst-best outcome, the medium-sized blue dot
the second-best outcome under BIC, and the smallest blue dot the second-best outcome under DIC.
strategy incentive compatible can be described by ve vertices, which (clockwise starting at the

































where we organize the four-dimensional vector representing the allocation rule by a matrix with
entries q11 = q(x;x), q12 = q(x;x), q21 = q(x;x), and q22 = q(x;x). Likewise, for the Bayesian









































Bayesian incentive compatibility requires that the sum of entries in the top row does not exceed
the sum of entries in the bottom row. In contrast, dominant strategy incentive compatibility
requires that the entries in the top row do not exceed the entries in the bottom row for both
columns. Notice that the nal two BIC matrices violate this more stringent condition.
The blue dots in Figure 5 indicate rst and second-best outcomes. For   1, the rst-best
outcomes under BIC and DIC are the same and correspond to the third DIC or BIC matrix.
When  > 1, the penultimate DIC matrix, which implies complete randomization, yields the
second-best outcome under dominant strategy implementation. Similarly, the penultimate BIC
matrix yields the second-best outcome under Bayesian implementation. BIC implementation
now leads to more social surplus than DIC, although it is no longer rst best.12
12For  = 2, the second-best outcomes under DIC and BIC are V = (12;21) and V = (63
4 ;18) respectively,
while the rst-best outcome is V = (45
2 ;15).
276. Conclusions
This paper introduces a novel approach to mechanism design, one that brings it closer to
standard micro-economic analyses of consumer and producer choice. The main insight is to
characterize the entire set of feasible and incentive compatible outcomes so that the optimal
mechanism can be derived using standard tools such as Hotelling's lemma. We do so by
providing a geometric interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints, which puts
them on an equal footing with basic resource constraints. Employing techniques from convex
analysis we are able to characterize the resulting high-dimensional set via its support function.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our geometric approach in several ways. First, we charac-
terize the set of feasible outcomes for a general class of social choice problems. The geometric
interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints translates into a well-dened minimiza-
tion process for the associated support function. Using arguments from majorization theory, we
show that this minimization problem naturally generates the \ironing" procedure rst described
by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Myerson (1981). Second, we provide a simple geometric proof
that when values are linear in types and types are independent, private, and one-dimensional,
the feasible sets that remain after imposing Bayesian or dominant strategy incentive compati-
bility coincide. Third, we derive the optimal mechanism for any social choice problem and any
linear objective, including revenue and surplus maximization. Fourth, we show how to incor-
porate other types of constraints, e.g. capacity constraints and budget balancedness. Finally,
when the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation breaks down
our approach naturally produces second-best outcomes for both types of incentive constraints.
Our geometric approach can be extended to continuous type spaces in a straightforward
manner, either by starting with support functions for innite dimensional sets or by considering
limit results of our discrete setting. For instance, the optimal allocation rule of Proposition
4 already applies to continuous types and the payment rule extends trivially by replacing the
sum with an integral. Throughout the paper, the interim support functions are expressed
as expectations over type proles, reecting either sums over discrete types or integrals over
continuous types. Indeed, we consider it a benet that our methodology produces parallel
results, e.g. optimal mechanisms and revenue equivalence, for continuous and discrete types.
Importantly, our geometric approach applies beyond the main assumptions of linear value
functions and independent, private, and one-dimensional types, see Proposition 9. As such
it may provide a powerful tool to study mechanism design problems that have hitherto re-
sisted thorough analysis because of analytical intractability, e.g. when type spaces are multi-
dimensional. We leave this exciting prospect as a topic for future research.
28A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We rst show that, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention
to sequences & that are non-decreasing. Suppose not and &j > &k for j < k. Then dene the
sequence ~ & with elements ~ &j = &j   "(&j   &k)=pj and ~ &k = &k + "(&j   &k)=pk while ~ &i = &i for
i 6= j;k. The sequence ~ & also satises  p ~ &. Since g() is convex we have
pjg(~ &j) + pkg(~ &k)  pjg(&j) + pkg(&k)
and, hence,
Pn
i=1 pig(~ &i) 
Pn
i=1 pig(&i). Repeatedly applying this procedure results in a
non-decreasing sequence ~ & that satises  p ~ &. But any such sequence is p-majorized by +
and Fact 6 proves the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from the basic denition of the support function
Sinterim(W) = max
X























Alternatively, we can derive the interim support function directly from the ex post support
function by applying Fact 4 to the linear transformation that corresponds to going from the ex
post to the interim stage (i.e. taking expectations over others' types). We have fi(xi)Vi(xi) = P
x i f(x)vi(x) where the interim expected value is multiplied by the probability to reect
that the inner product at the interim stage is probability weighted. Using Fact 4, the interim
support function follows by evaluating the ex post support function at wi(x) = f(x)Wi(xi). 
Proof of Proposition 2. The implications of the DIC constraints for the ex post support
function in (2) follows from Fact 3:
S
DIC
























0. As in the proof of Proposition 1, the interim support function simply follows by evaluat-
ing the ex post support function at wi(x) = f(x)Wi(xi). If we also replace i(xi;x i) with














































i ) for j = 1;:::;Ni, and i(x0
i) = i(x
Ni
i ) = 0. 
29Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the minimization of the interim BIC support function (7)

















is a convex function of y. Recall
from Lemma 1 that W
+
i solves this minimization problem. Repeating this argument for each
agent i = 1;:::;I yields SBIC
interim(W) = Sinterim(W+).
Next consider the minimization of the interim DIC support function (6) with respect to the
shifted weights f Wi(x) = Wi(xi)   i(x)=fi(xi). Assume f Wj(x) = f W
+
j (xj) for x 2 IR
jXj and
j 6= i, and consider the minimization problem with respect to agent i's shifted weights only.
In other words, for each x i, consider the minimization problem with respect to the vector

















is a convex function of y. For each
x i, f Wi(;x i) = W
+
i solves the minimization problem. Therefore, one cannot lower the value
by changing f Wi(x) for agent i only when f Wj(x) = W
+
j (xj) for j 6= i are xed. This implies
that W
+
i (xi) is a local minimum of the interim DIC support function (6) and since the support
function is convex it is also the global minimum (e.g. Rockafellar, 1997). Hence, the interim
support functions coincide: SBIC
interim(W) = SDIC
interim(W) = Sinterim(W+). 























































































































































which establishes optimality of the allocation rule in equation (8). The payment rule in equation
(9) follows from Lemma 2. 






















where we interpret 0=0 as 0. The payment rule follows from Lemma 2. 
Proof of Proposition 7. A solution to (10) must satisfy




for m =    1;:::;I   1. Dene ^ m = m(x   x)m to obtain the recursive equation




The support function can now be calculated as
































The other statements follow from Fact 5 and direct calculations. 





max(0;Wb(xb)   Ws(xs) + (MRb(xb)   MRs(xs)))












where 1() denotes an indicator function. The ex post allocation rule can now easily be read
o since Qb(xb) = Exs(q(xb;xs)) and Qs(xs) = Exb(q(xb;xs)).
The optimal  can be found by equating the derivative of the constrained support function

















Hence, fully ecient trade cannot occur. Likewise, no trade requires  = 1, but then the left
side is strictly positive since MR1
b (xb) = MRb(xb) and MR1
s (xs) = MRs(xs). 






















The interim expected values are given by Vi(xi) =
P













where, as before, we multiplied by fi(xi), i.e. we used the probability weighted inner product
 to dene the set of interim expected values. 
13Since the inner product  is probability weighted, the components @Wi(xi) of r are multiplied by 1=fi(xi).
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